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Abstract
This paper establishes a robust link between momentum and credit rating. Mo-
mentum proﬁtability is large and signiﬁcant among low-grade ﬁrms, but it is
nonexistent among high-grade ﬁrms. The momentum payoﬀs documented in the
literature are generated by low-grade ﬁrms that account for less than 4% of the
overall market capitalization of rated ﬁrms. The momentum payoﬀ diﬀerential
across credit rating groups is unexplained by ﬁrm size, ﬁrm age, analyst forecast
dispersion, leverage, return volatility, and cash ﬂow volatility.
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egy of buying past winners and selling past losers provides statistically signiﬁcant and
economically large payoﬀs. The empirical evidence on stock return momentum has been
particularly intriguing because it points to a violation of weak-form market eﬃciency.
In particular, Fama and French (1996) show that momentum proﬁtability is the only
CAPM-related anomaly unexplained by the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model.
Moreover, Schwert (2003) demonstrates that market anomalies related to proﬁt opportu-
nities, including the size and value eﬀects in the cross section of average returns, as well
as time-series predictability by the dividend yield, typically disappear, reverse, or attenu-
ate following their discovery. In contrast, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001, 2002) document
the proﬁtability of momentum strategies after its initial discovery. The robustness of
momentum proﬁtability has generated a variety of explanations, both behavioral and
risk based.1
It has also been shown that momentum proﬁtability is related to business conditions.
Speciﬁcally, Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) document that momentum payoﬀs are large
during expansions and non-existent during recessions. Avramov and Chordia (2005)
demonstrate that the impact of past returns on future returns cannot be captured by
conditional and unconditional risk-based asset pricing models. However, they show that
the momentum payoﬀs are related to the component of model mispricing that varies
with business cycle variables such as the Treasury Bill yield, the term spread, and the
default spread. Since credit risk varies over the business cycle, it is natural to ask
whether the momentum payoﬀs are related to the credit risk of ﬁrms. In this paper, we
provide a new and unexplored dimension in understanding the proﬁtability of momentum
strategies. We show that momentum proﬁts are restricted to high credit risk ﬁrms and
are nonexistent for ﬁrms of high credit quality.
Speciﬁcally, based on a sample of 3,578 NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ ﬁrms rated by
S&P over the July 1985-December 2003 period,2 we show that over formation periods of
1three, six, nine, and twelve months, the extreme loser and winner portfolios of Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993) consist of stocks with the lowest and the next lowest credit rating,
respectively. The average rating of the entire sample of rated ﬁrms is BBB. The extreme
loser (winner) portfolio has an average rating of BB− (BB+). The extreme losers and
winners are the only non-investment grade portfolios in the sample of rated ﬁrms.
Trading strategies that condition on three credit rating and ten prior six-month
return groups yield momentum payoﬀs that increase monotonically with the credit risk –
they increase from an insigniﬁcant 0.27% per month for the best quality debt tercile to
a signiﬁcant 2.35% for the worst. Similarly, based on ten credit rating and three past
return portfolios, momentum payoﬀs increase from an insigniﬁcant 0.07% per month for
the highest credit quality decile to a signiﬁcant 2.04% for the worst. Among the low rated
ﬁrms, loser stocks are the dominant source of return continuation and the proﬁtability of
momentum strategies. Based on ten credit risk and three past return groups, the return
diﬀerential between the lowest and highest credit risk loser ﬁrms averages 1.60% per
month, whereas the return diﬀerential for the winner ﬁrms is, on average, only 0.37%.
We also implement momentum strategies based on the prior six-month return for
diﬀerent samples of rated ﬁrms, as we sequentially exclude the lowest rated ﬁrms. Strik-
ingly, the signiﬁcant proﬁts to momentum strategies are derived from a sample of ﬁrms
that accounts for less than four percent of the market capitalization of all rated ﬁrms
and for about 22 percent of the total number of rated ﬁrms. When we exclude ﬁrms
with an overall S&P rating of D, C, CC, CCC−, CCC+, B−, B, B+ and BB−, the
momentum strategy payoﬀs from the remaining ﬁrms, which account for 96.6% of the
overall market capitalization of rated ﬁrms, become statistically insigniﬁcant.
Recent work has demonstrated the signiﬁcance of momentum for certain subsamples
of stocks. For instance, Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2006) and Zhang (2006) demonstrate
higher momentum payoﬀs among ﬁrms with higher information uncertainty. Informa-
tion uncertainty is proxied by ﬁrm size, ﬁrm age, return volatility, cash ﬂow volatility,
2and analyst forecast dispersion. However, our ﬁndings suggests that the credit rating
eﬀect on momentum is independent of and is much stronger than the eﬀect of all these
information uncertainty variables. In particular, the information uncertainty variables
do not capture the momentum proﬁts across credit rating groups but credit rating does
capture the momentum proﬁts across the uncertainty variables. Speciﬁcally, momen-
tum payoﬀs occur among large-capitalization ﬁrms that are low rated, but are absent
in small-capitalization highly rated ﬁrms. Thus, while momentum proﬁtability does not
exclusively arise in small stocks, it is exclusively found amongst low rated stocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the data.
Section II. presents the results and Section III. presents robustness checks. Section IV.
concludes.
I. Data
We extract monthly returns on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks listed in the
CRSP database, subject to several selection criteria. First, stocks must have at least
six consecutive monthly return observations. In addition, as in Jegadeesh and Titman
(2001), we exclude stocks that, at the beginning of the holding period, are priced below
$5 or have market capitalization that would place them in the bottom NYSE decile.
While this is done to ensure that the empirical ﬁndings are not driven by low priced and
extremely illiquid stocks, we ﬁnd that our results are robust to the inclusion of stocks
below $5 and those that belong to the smallest decile. The ﬁltering procedure delivers
a universe of 13,018 stocks. From this universe, we choose those stocks that are rated
by Standard & Poor’s, leaving us with 3,578 rated stocks over the July 1985 through
December 2003 period. The beginning of our sample is determined by the ﬁrst time ﬁrm
ratings by Standard & Poor’s become available on the COMPUSTAT tapes.
The S&P issuer rating used here is an essential component of our analysis. The
3Standard & Poor’s assigns this rating to a ﬁrm, not an individual bond. As deﬁned by
S&P, prior to 1998, this issuer rating is based on the ﬁrm’s most senior publicly traded
debt. After 1998, this rating is based on the overall quality of the ﬁrm’s outstanding
debt, either public or private. Before 1998, the issuer rating represents a select subsample
of company bonds. After 1998, it represents all company debt. We transform the S&P
ratings into conventional numerical scores. In particular, 1 represents a rating of AAA
and 22 reﬂects a D rating.3 Thus, a higher numerical score corresponds to a lower credit
rating or higher credit risk. Numerical ratings of 10 or below (BBB− or better) are
considered investment-grade, and ratings of 11 or higher (BB+ or worse) are labelled
high-yield or non-investment grade. The equally weighted average rating of the 3,578
ﬁrms in our sample is 8.83 (approximately BBB, the investment-grade threshold) and
the median is 9 (BBB).
To make sure that our sample of stocks is representative, in Table I we compare rated
and unrated ﬁrms. It is important to note that although the total number of rated ﬁrms
is much smaller than that of unrated ﬁrms (there are 3,578 rated ﬁrms and 9,440 unrated
ﬁrms, a ratio of 2.6 to 1), the average per month number of rated and unrated ﬁrms are
considerably closer (1,639 rated ﬁrms and 2,246 unrated ﬁrms, a more appealing ratio
of 1.4 to 1). Table I
Panel A of Table I presents monthly returns for the loser portfolio (P1), the winner
portfolio (P10), and the momentum strategy of buying the winner and selling the loser
portfolio (P10−P1). Momentum portfolios are constructed as in Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993). At the beginning of each month t, we rank all eligible stocks on the basis of their
cumulative return over the formation period (months t−6 to t−1) and assign them to
one of ten portfolios based on their prior six-month return. These portfolios are then held
for K months. We skip a month between the formation and holding periods (months
t+1 to t+K). Each portfolio return is calculated as the equally weighted average return
of the corresponding stocks. The monthly momentum strategy return for a K-month
4holding period is based on an equally weighted average of the portfolio returns from
strategies implemented in the current month and the previous K − 1 months.4
The evidence in Panel A suggests similar momentum proﬁtability among rated
and unrated stocks. In particular, the momentum proﬁt (P10−P1) averages 1.29%
(t-stat=3.15) per month for rated ﬁrms and 1.43% (t-stat=3.41) for unrated ﬁrms. For
both rated and unrated ﬁrms, momentum proﬁts are prominent over expansionary peri-
ods, as well as in non-January months. Consistent with Jegadeesh and Titman (1993),
momentum proﬁts are negative in January. We have also examined the industry distri-
bution of our sample of 3,578 Standard & Poor rated ﬁrms relative to the overall sample
of 13,018 NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ ﬁrms listed on CRSP. The twenty industries
considered were those analyzed by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). The evidence shows
(results are available upon request) that the industry distributions of rated and unrated
ﬁrms are similar, ruling out concerns that rated ﬁrms are concentrated in particular
industries.
Panel B of Table I provides descriptive statistics for the distribution of raw monthly
returns in the sample of rated and unrated ﬁrms. The moments of the stock return
distribution, as well as the average alphas and market betas, are similar across the two
categories. For instance, the mean monthly stock return is 1.35% among rated ﬁrms
and 1.24% among all ﬁrms during the period July 1985 to December 2003. The mean
CAPM alpha (beta) of rated ﬁrms is 0.16% (1.04), and 0.05% (1.06) among all ﬁrms.
The mean Fama-French alpha is -0.01% (0.02%) per month for rated (all) ﬁrms. It is also
evident from Panel B that rated ﬁrms have substantially larger market capitalization
than unrated ﬁrms.
Overall, Table I conﬁrms that our sample of rated ﬁrms is representative. Both
rated and unrated ﬁrms produce similar momentum proﬁts, they share similar industry
distributions, and they have similar stock return distributions.
5II. Results
A. Momentum and ﬁrm credit rating over the formation period
To establish the ﬁrst link between momentum trading strategies and credit risk, we
examine the average numerical credit rating for each of the ten momentum portfolios
over formation periods of three, six, nine, and twelve months. The results are presented
in Table II. The extreme loser portfolio (P1) is heavily tilted towards ﬁrms with the
lowest quality debt. For example, focusing on a six-month formation period, the average
numerical rating of the loser portfolio is 13.06 (BB−), which is much above the average
rating of 8.83 (BBB). The extreme winner portfolio (P10) also consists of high credit
risk stocks, recording an average credit rating of 11.19 (BB+). The middle portfolio
(P6) has the best credit rating of 7.64 (BBB+). Indeed, the average credit rating forms
a U-shape across the various momentum portfolios. This suggests that the momentum
strategy of buying previous losers and selling previous winners essentially takes long and
short positions in ﬁrms with the highest credit risk. Table II
Table III presents the composition of unrated, investment grade, and non-investment
grade ﬁrms in decile portfolios sorted on past six month returns. There are more unrated
ﬁrms in the extreme winner and loser portfolios. Also, there are signiﬁcantly fewer
ﬁrms with investment grade rating and more ﬁrms with non-investment grade rating
in the extreme portfolios. Finally, the return diﬀerential between the winner and loser
portfolios is a statistically insigniﬁcant (signiﬁcant) 0.77% (2.12%) per month for the
investment (non-investment) grade ﬁrms and is 1.48% for the unrated ﬁrms. Overall,
the evidence supports our claim that low credit rated ﬁrms, or ﬁrms that would be low
rated if they had a rating, drive the momentum phenomenon. Table III
6B. Momentum proﬁtability and credit rating
We implement momentum strategies by conditioning on both credit rating and cumu-
lative six-month formation period returns. We ﬁrst consider three credit rating groups
and ten formation period return portfolios. We then study ten credit rating groups and
three past six-month return portfolios. Credit-risk-past-return groups are formed on a
sequential basis, sorting ﬁrst on credit rating and then on past returns.5 For each month
t, the low/high credit risk group (group 1 / group 3) contains the 30% best/worst rated
stocks based on their S&P rating for this particular month. The stocks in each group
are then divided into ten momentum portfolios based on their return over months t− 6
to t − 1. The ten credit risk groups are formed each month by dividing the sample of
ﬁrms in that month into deciles based on the credit ratings. Each of the resulting credit
rating groups is then divided into three momentum portfolios (P1, P2, P3) containing
the worst 30%, middle 40%, and top 30% performers based on their past six-month
returns. The two sequential rankings generate 30 credit-risk-momentum portfolios.
Panel A of Table IV presents the momentum proﬁts corresponding to the three credit
risk and ten momentum groups. Payoﬀs to momentum strategies strongly depend upon
the credit rating. Focusing on the low (stocks with an average rating of 4.97 ≈ A+) and
medium (rating of 8.5 ≈ BBB+) credit risk groups, the average payoﬀ to the P10−P1
strategy is 0.27% (t-stat=0.88) and 0.75% (t-stat=2.12) per month, respectively. The
payoﬀ is much larger as well as statistically and economically signiﬁcant at 2.35% (t-
stat=4.21) for the highest credit risk group (rating of 13.02 ≈ BB−). Momentum proﬁts
are highest in ﬁrms with the poorest quality of outstanding debt, as rated by S&P. This
is a new ﬁnding that sheds light on the source of proﬁtability of momentum strategies. Table IV
Momentum strategy payoﬀs in the non-January months are also insigniﬁcant for the
lowest risk tercile. For the medium risk stocks the momentum payoﬀs are a signiﬁcant
0.95% per month and for the high risk stocks the payoﬀs are 2.70% per month. The
7payoﬀs in January are negative albeit statistically insigniﬁcant. During recessions, the
momentum strategy payoﬀs increase monotonically with credit risk but are statistically
insigniﬁcant.6 On the other hand, during expansions, not only do the payoﬀs increase
monotonically with credit risk, but they are a statistically and economically signiﬁcant
2.30% per month for the poorest credit quality ﬁrms.
Panel B of Table IV presents the results for ten credit risk and three momentum
portfolios. Again, the evidence shows that momentum proﬁts strongly depend on credit
risk. Focusing on the lowest risk group (average rating 3.17 ≈ AA), the monthly momen-
tum proﬁt (P3−P1) is an insigniﬁcant 0.07%. Payoﬀs to momentum strategies increase
monotonically across the credit rating groups. The highest momentum payoﬀ of 2.04%
(t-stat=4.63) per month is recorded for the highest credit risk group (average rating
14.52 ≈ B). Consistent with the results in Table III momentum proﬁts become sta-
tistically signiﬁcant only when the credit quality deteriorates to a rating of BBB− or
below (BBB or below for the non-January months). During economic expansions, it is
once again only stocks rated BBB− or lower that exhibit signiﬁcant momentum proﬁts.
Panel B of Table IV documents that the diﬀerence in momentum proﬁts across credit
risk groups is driven primarily by loser stocks. The return diﬀerential between the loser
portfolios (P1) for the lowest and highest credit risk ﬁrms averages 1.60% per month
[1.13-(-0.47)], whereas the winner portfolio (P3) for the highest credit risk ﬁrms earns,
on average, only 0.37% more than its lowest credit counterpart [1.56-1.19].
Thus far, we have examined the relation between momentum proﬁtability and credit
risk using portfolio strategies based on double sorting, ﬁrst by credit risk then by prior
six-month return. We now turn to implementing the traditional momentum strategies,
those based only on prior six-month return, but we consider diﬀerent investment subsam-
ples. In particular, we start with the entire sample of rated ﬁrms and then sequentially
exclude ﬁrms with the highest credit risk (worst credit rating). This analysis will reveal
the subsample of ﬁrms that drives momentum proﬁts.
8Table V reports the average payoﬀs from momentum strategies in each subsample as
we progressively drop the worst-rated ﬁrms. It also provides the percentage of market
capitalization represented by each subsample, as well as the percentage of the total
number of ﬁrms included in each subsample. These two measures are computed each
month, and we report the time-series average. The payoﬀs to momentum strategies are
insigniﬁcant at the 5% level when the investment sample contains stocks in the rating
range AAA through BB. Remarkably, this sample accounts for 96.62% of the market
capitalization of the rated ﬁrms and it contains 78.84% of the total number of the rated
ﬁrms. In other words, the momentum proﬁts are derived from a sample of ﬁrms that
accounts for less than four percent of the total market capitalization of all rated ﬁrms
or less than twenty-two percent of all rated ﬁrms. Table V
As we progressively drop the best-rated ﬁrms (results available upon request), the
momentum proﬁts increase monotonically as only the worst-rated ﬁrms remain in the
sample. For a sample of stocks rated B or lower, the momentum proﬁt amounts to
3.74% per month. More remarkably, there are only about 70 ﬁrms on average per month
that are rated B or lower. These 70 ﬁrms comprise only 0.77% of the sample by market
capitalization and 4.22% of the total number of ﬁrms. In other words, the momentum
phenomenon occurs in a small fraction of the worst rated stocks.
III. Robustness checks
In this section we conduct numerous checks to ensure that the impact of credit rating
on momentum is robust to various alternative explanations.
9A. Could credit ratings proxy for systematic risk?
Thus far, we have examined raw momentum strategy payoﬀs. A natural exercise
would be to risk-adjust the raw payoﬀs to ensure that the proﬁtability of momentum
strategies among high credit risk ﬁrms does not merely compensate for exposures to
common sources of risk. We regress the momentum payoﬀs for the three credit risk
groups on the three Fama and French (1993) factors as well on the excess market return.
Focusing on the Fama-French factors (available upon request) we ﬁnd that the monthly
alphas are 0.41% (t-stat=1.28), 1.02% (t-stat=2.85), and 2.53% (t-stat=4.47) for the low,
middle, and high credit risk groups, respectively. If anything, the alphas are higher than
the raw momentum payoﬀs reported in Table IV, suggesting that loser stocks are riskier
than winner stocks and that the momentum strategy does not have positive exposure
to systematic risk factors. The evidence strongly suggests that momentum proﬁtability
across high credit risk ﬁrms does not represent compensation for systematic risk, at least
based on the CAPM and the Fama-French three factor model.
B. Momentum proﬁts in various subsamples
Recent work argues that momentum is stronger in stocks that have high information
uncertainty. Information uncertainty is the degree of ambiguity about ﬁrm fundamen-
tals. High information uncertainty ﬁrms can be associated with higher information
acquisition costs and less reliable estimates of their value. Speciﬁcally, Jiang, Lee, and
Zhang (2006) and Zhang (2006) argue that the price drift is larger in stocks with greater
information uncertainty, which is proxied by ﬁrm size, ﬁrm age, analyst coverage, dis-
persion in analyst forecasts, return volatility, and cash ﬂow volatility.7
An essential question that arises is whether the impact of credit ratings on momen-
tum proﬁtability is subsumed by information uncertainty. To address this question, we
assess the robustness of momentum proﬁtability across the credit rating dimension based
10on 3 × 3 portfolios sorted independently on credit rating and variables that proxy for
information uncertainty.
Panel A of Table VI presents results for sorts by credit rating and ﬁrm size. Mo-
mentum returns increase with credit risk across all size groups. For instance, for the
small (large) ﬁrms, momentum returns increase monotonically from 0.31% (0.28%) to
2.66% (1.79%) per month moving from low risk to high risk ﬁrms. While the momentum
proﬁts decrease with size for the high risk ﬁrms, there is no impact of size in the low
risk ﬁrms. There is some interaction between ﬁrm size and credit risk as the highest
momentum return exists in the small, high risk ﬁrms (2.66%) and the lowest exists in
the large, low risk ﬁrms (0.28%). Overall, it is credit risk and not ﬁrm size that provides
the divergent momentum returns. Table VI
Panels B and C show similar results for ﬁrm volatility and leverage.8 For instance,
when sorting independently on credit risk and volatility, the monthly momentum returns
to low credit risk, high and low volatility stocks are a statistically insigniﬁcant -0.07%
and 0.11%, respectively. In other words, there is no diﬀerential momentum return across
volatility for the low credit risk stocks. When sorting on credit risk and leverage, the
monthly momentum payoﬀs to the high risk, low leverage and high leverage stocks are
2.76% and 2.80%, respectively. Once again, there is no diﬀerential momentum return
across leverage amongst the high risk stocks.
Panel D presents the results for sorts on credit rating and age.9 Momentum returns
increase monotonically with credit risk across all age groups. Also, the momentum
strategy proﬁts decrease with ﬁrm age but the eﬀect is absent amongst the low risk
ﬁrms. Importantly, the diﬀerential impact of ﬁrm age on momentum proﬁts is far smaller
that that of credit risk. Similar results are obtained for sorts on credit rating and cash
ﬂow volatility (CVOL)10 in Panel E and for sorts on credit rating and analyst forecast
dispersion in Panel F. While momentum returns increase monotonically with credit risk
across all CVOL and analyst forecast dispersion groups, the reverse is not true. More
11importantly the diﬀerential impact of credit risk on momentum proﬁts is far larger than
the impact of CVOL or that of analyst forecast dispersion.
In sum, sorting on credit rating provides a payoﬀ diﬀerential in momentum strategies,
but the same need not hold for sorting on size, return volatility, leverage, cash ﬂow
volatility, ﬁrm age, and analyst forecast dispersion.11 These proxies for information
uncertainty seem to provide diﬀerential momentum payoﬀs only in the case of the high
credit risk stocks, whereas credit risk provides diﬀerential momentum payoﬀs across
diﬀerent values of the information uncertainty variables. The evidence strongly suggests
that credit risk has an independent eﬀect not captured by variables that proxy for
information uncertainty.
C. The impact of distress
Table II shows that, over the formation period, the extreme loser and winner port-
folios contain a disproportionately large number of high credit risk ﬁrms. Moreover, the
average credit rating of the loser stocks (BB-) is lower than that of the winner stocks
(BB+). We also ﬁnd that the diﬀerence in returns between the highest and the low-
est decile rating group is 0.61% per month and the diﬀerence between the highest and
the second to last rating decile portfolio is 0.18% per month, suggesting that distressed
stocks experience lower average returns. To summarize, we have the following three
facts: (i) the momentum strategy goes long (short) the winner (loser) stocks, (ii) loser
stocks have, on average, lower ratings than winner stocks, and (iii) lower rated stocks
earn lower returns. These three facts combined suggest that the impact of distress should
result in higher returns for momentum portfolios that are long winners and short losers.
Thus, an essential question that arises is whether the impact of credit ratings on mo-
mentum proﬁtability is entirely explained by distressed stocks that realize lower returns.
We rule out this possibility for several reasons. First, the maximum return diﬀerential
12across decile rating portfolios is only 61 basis points per month (results not reported),
whereas, as noted earlier, the return diﬀerential across winner and loser low-rated stocks
is over 2% per month. Moreover, we implement momentum strategies on credit-rating-
adjusted returns by subtracting the matched decile credit rating portfolio holding period
return from the individual stock holding period return. The rating-momentum relation
is robust to such an adjustment (results available upon request). Finally, observe from
Panel C of Table VI that the impact of leverage on momentum strategy proﬁts is far
smaller than that of credit rating. Since leverage can be thought of as a proxy for
distress, this suggests that it is not distress but credit ratings that drive our results.
D. Other robustness checks
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) document that industry momentum accounts for
much of the individual stock return momentum. Hence, stronger momentum in lower
rated stocks could be attributed to such stocks being concentrated in one particular
industry that consistently exhibits higher momentum. However, we conﬁrm that our
ﬁndings are not driven by industry momentum. In particular, following Moskowitz and
Grinblatt (1999), we compute industry-adjusted stock returns by subtracting from each
stock return over the holding period, the return of the corresponding industry over the
same period. The credit risk eﬀect on momentum proﬁtability is robust to such an
industry adjustment (results are unreported but available upon request).
In a similar manner, we have implemented further robustness checks, controlling for
size, volatility, trading volume, illiquidity, analyst coverage, and analyst forecast disper-
sion. Indeed, low rated stocks are smaller, have higher volatility, lower liquidity, lower
analyst coverage, and higher forecast dispersion than high rated stocks. We subtract
the decile portfolio return corresponding to the above characteristics from the holding
period returns of the individual stocks in the winner and the loser portfolios. The re-
13sults (available upon request) show that the link between momentum and credit risk
remains strong and signiﬁcant even after controlling for the above potentially relevant
momentum determinants.
IV. Conclusion
This paper establishes a strong link between momentum proﬁtability and ﬁrm credit
rating. The empirical ﬁndings are based on a sample of 3,578 NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ ﬁrms rated by S&P over the July 1985-December 2003 period. The selected
sample is representative, as rated and non-rated ﬁrms share similar characteristics in
terms of (i) their stock return distribution, (ii) the momentum proﬁts they generate,
and (iii) their industry distribution among the 20 industries studied by Moskowitz and
Grinblatt (1999).
The extreme winner and loser portfolios are comprised mainly of high credit risk
stocks. Momentum proﬁtability is statistically signiﬁcant and economically large among
low-rated ﬁrms, but it is nonexistent among high-grade ﬁrms. The results are robust and
cannot be explained by the information uncertainty variables as proxied by ﬁrm size,
ﬁrm age, analyst forecast dispersion, leverage, return volatility, and cash ﬂow volatility.
Excluding from the analysis the highest credit risk ﬁrms, which account altogether for
less than four percent of market capitalization of rated ﬁrms, renders the momentum
proﬁtability statistically insigniﬁcant.
Indeed, our cross-sectional analysis explicitly shows that momentum trading strate-
gies are proﬁtable only among the highest credit risk ﬁrms. This may suggest that
aggregate momentum payoﬀs are higher during recessionary periods when credit risk
is a major concern. However, as noted earlier, the time-series analysis demonstrates
that momentum proﬁtability does vary with the business cycle, but apparently in the
wrong direction, that is momentum payoﬀs are economically and statistically signiﬁcant
14only during expansions when there are fewer defaults. This disagreement between the
cross-sectional and time-series ﬁndings is a puzzle that future work should address.
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17Table I
Descriptive Statistics
PANEL A: Raw Momentum in Rated and Unrated Firms
For each month t, all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks on the monthly CRSP tape with returns for
months t−6 through t−1 are ranked into decile portfolios according to their cumulative return during
that period. We exclude stocks which at the end of month t−1 are priced below $5 or are smaller than
the smallest NYSE size decile. Decile portfolios are formed monthly and their returns are computed by
weighting equally all ﬁrms in that decile ranking. The momentum strategy involves buying the winner
portfolio P10 and selling the loser portfolio P1. The positions are held for the following six-months
(t+1 through t+6). There is a one month lag between the formation and the holding periods. Monthly
returns represent the equally-weighted average return from this month’s momentum strategy and all
strategies from up to ﬁve months ago. The table shows the average raw monthly proﬁts during the
holding period of the winner P10 and loser P1 portfolios as well as the momentum strategy returns.
t-statistics are in parentheses (bold if indicating 5% level of signiﬁcance). The sample period is July
1985 - December 2003.
All Rated Unrated
Firms Firms Firms
# of Firms 13,018 3,578 9,440
Overall P10−P1 1.49 1.29 1.43
(3.48) (3.15) (3.41)
P1 0.17 0.25 -0.05
(0.29) (0.45) (-0.07)
P10 1.66 1.54 1.39
(3.15) (3.74) (2.46)
Non-January P10−P1 1.82 1.54 1.81
(4.55) (3.96) (4.70)
P1 -0.32 -0.07 -0.60
(-0.55) (-0.13) (-0.99)
P10 1.51 1.47 1.21
(2.69) (3.37) (2.02)
January P10−P1 -2.36 -1.58 -2.86
(-0.92) (-0.65) (-1.08)
P1 5.72 3.97 6.21
(1.90) (1.53) (1.91)
P10 3.37 2.39 3.34
(2.59) (1.91) (2.49)
Expansion P10−P1 1.49 1.27 1.43
(3.39) (3.03) (3.31)
P1 0.12 0.30 -0.14
(0.20) (0.55) (-0.23)
P10 1.61 1.57 1.29
(2.95) (3.72) (2.21)
Recession P10−P1 1.42 1.48 1.46
(0.80) (0.83) (0.81)
P1 0.83 -0.29 1.14
(0.24) (-0.09) (0.32)
P10 2.25 1.18 2.60
(1.09) (0.65) (1.18)
18Table I (continued)
PANEL B: Return and Size Characteristics of Sample Firms
The table presents descriptive statistics of monthly returns for stocks rated by Standard & Poor’s and
for all stocks listed on CRSP. We exclude observations where at time t−1 the price is below $5, and the
market capitalization is in the lowest NYSE size decile. Returns are computed as the time-series mean
of the cross-sectional average return for each month (in % per month). Standard deviation, skewness,
kurtosis, alphas, and betas, are computed for each stock and then averaged across all stocks. Alphas are
in percentages per month. Alphas and betas are based on stocks with at least 25 return observations
during the sample period. Size is computed as the time-series mean of the cross-sectional mean of all
market capitalizations in each month (in $billions). The sample period is July 1985 to December 2003.
Firms Rated by S&P All Firms
Return - Equally weighted Mean 1.35 1.24
Return - Value Weighted Mean 1.11 1.09
Return - Standard Deviation 12.39 13.50
Return - Skewness 0.25 0.34
Return - Kurtosis 5.00 5.13
CAPM Alpha - Mean 0.16 0.05
CAPM Beta - Mean 1.04 1.06
FF Alpha - Mean -0.01 0.02
FF Mkt Beta - Mean 1.14 1.04
Size - Mean 3.06 0.98
Table II
Credit Rating Proﬁle of Momentum Portfolios over Formation Period
For each month t, all stocks rated by Standard & Poor’s with returns for months t − J through t − 1
(formation period) available on CRSP are ranked into decile portfolios according to their return during
the formation period. We exclude stocks which at the end of month t − 1 are priced below $5 or
are smaller than the smallest NYSE size decile. The table shows for each decile portfolio the median
numeric S&P rating during formation periods of J=3, J=6, J=9, and J=12 months. This S&P rating
is assigned by Standard & Poor’s to a ﬁrm (not a bond) based on the overall quality of the ﬁrm’s
outstanding debt, either public or private. The rating is available from COMPUSTAT on a quarterly
basis starting in 1985. We transform the S&P ratings into conventional numeric scores. The numeric
rating corresponds to: AAA=1, AA+=2, AA=3, AA−=4, A+=5, A=6, A−=7, BBB+=8, BBB=9,
BBB−=10, BB+=11, BB=12, BB−=13, B+=14, B=15, B−=16, CCC+=17, CCC=18, CCC−=19,
CC=20, C=21, D=22. The sample includes 3,453 ﬁrms. The sample period is July 1985 to December
2003.
J=3 J=6 J=9 J=12
P1 12.85 13.06 13.18 13.22
P2 9.84 10.12 10.29 10.30
P3 8.66 8.64 8.69 8.62
P4 8.06 8.07 8.00 7.93
P5 7.77 7.75 7.64 7.58
P6 7.72 7.64 7.61 7.49
P7 7.81 7.69 7.60 7.53
P8 8.08 7.89 7.70 7.66
P9 8.91 8.59 8.34 8.22
P10 11.44 11.19 11.01 10.91
19Table III
Composition of Momentum Portfolios
For each month t, all stocks rated by Standard & Poor’s with returns for months t − 6 through t − 1
(formation period) available on CRSP are ranked into decile portfolios according to their return during
the formation period. We exclude stocks which at the end of month t − 1 are priced below $5 or are
smaller than the smallest NYSE size decile. The ﬁrst three columns in the table show for each decile
portfolio the percentage of stocks with no rating, and the percentage of stocks that are investment-grade
(IG) and non-investment grade (NIG). The last three columns show the equally weighted average return
of the three groups in each portfolio. IG represents S&P rating of BBB- or better and NIG represents
S&P rating of BB+ or worse. The sample period is July 1985 to December 2003.
Composition (% of Stocks) Returns (% per month)
Portfolio No Rating IG NIG No Rating IG NIG
P1 75.24 9.32 15.44 0.17 0.97 -0.32
P2 70.92 17.63 11.44 0.57 1.08 0.22
P3 69.80 21.20 9.00 0.81 1.09 0.52
P4 70.52 22.01 7.47 0.93 1.11 0.81
P5 70.68 22.63 6.69 0.99 1.12 0.81
P6 69.70 23.70 6.60 1.03 1.13 0.77
P7 69.31 23.55 7.15 1.14 1.12 0.78
P8 70.04 21.47 8.50 1.19 1.17 1.01
P9 73.08 16.81 10.11 1.35 1.30 1.11
P10 81.58 7.13 11.29 1.65 1.74 1.80
P10-P1 1.48 0.77 2.12
(3.70) (1.77) (4.29)
20Table IV
Momentum By Credit Risk Group
For each month t, all stocks rated by Standard & Poor’s with available return data for months t − 6
through t−1 (formation period) are divided into three groups (top 30%, middle 40%, and bottom 30%)
[PANEL A] (as well as deciles [PANEL B]) based on their credit rating. We exclude stocks which at
the end of month t−1 are priced below $5 or are smaller than the smallest NYSE size decile. For each
credit rating group, we compute the return of the loser portfolio P1 as the equally-weighted average
return over the holding period of the worst-performing 10% [PANEL A] (30% [PANEL B]) and the
winner portfolio P10 (P3 in PANEL B) of the best-performing 10% [PANEL A] (30% [PANEL B]) of
the stocks based on their returns over the formation period. There is a one month lag between the
formation and the holding periods. The momentum strategy involves buying the winner portfolio and
selling the loser portfolio and holding the position for six months. Since the momentum strategy is
implemented each month, the monthly returns represent the equally-weighted average return from this
month’s momentum strategy and all strategies from up to ﬁve months ago. The table shows, for each
credit rating group, the average returns of the momentum strategy, as well as the average return of
the loser and winner portfolios. The sample period is July 1985 to December 2003. The numeric S&P
rating is presented in ascending order by credit risk, i.e. 1=AAA, 2=AA+, 3=AA, ..., 21=C, 22=D.
PANEL A: 10 Momentum and 3 Credit Rating Groups
Rating Group (1=Lowest Risk, 3=Highest Risk)
1 2 3
Average A+ BBB+ BB−
Rating 4.97 8.50 13.02
Overall P10−P1 0.27 0.75 2.35
(0.88) (2.12) (4.21)
P1 1.12 0.81 -0.43
(2.81) (1.68) (-0.59)
P10 1.40 1.56 1.92
(4.13) (4.26) (3.77)
Non-January P10−P1 0.43 0.95 2.70
(1.38) (2.69) (5.21)
P1 0.98 0.61 -0.92
(2.36) (1.21) (-1.28)
P10 1.41 1.56 1.78
(4.03) (4.05) (3.31)
January P10−P1 -1.54 -1.55 -1.59
(-1.10) (-0.93) (-0.45)
P1 2.76 3.10 5.08
(1.87) (1.80) (1.29)
P10 1.22 1.55 3.48
(0.94) (1.31) (2.36)
Expansion P10−P1 0.30 0.78 2.30
(0.94) (2.12) (4.02)
P1 1.14 0.85 -0.39
(2.95) (1.78) (-0.55)
P10 1.44 1.63 1.91
(4.11) (4.32) (3.69)
Recession P10−P1 -0.06 0.38 3.01
(-0.04) (0.29) (1.23)
P1 0.89 0.34 -0.94
(0.38) (0.13) (-0.21)
P10 0.84 0.72 2.07
(0.65) (0.47) (0.86)
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22Table V
Unconditional Momentum over Diﬀerent Rating Subsamples
For each month t, all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks rated by S&P and available on CRSP with
returns for months t−6 through t−1 are ranked into decile portfolios based on their return during that
period. We exclude stocks which at the end of month t−1 are priced below $5 or are smaller than the
smallest NYSE size decile. Portfolio returns are computed monthly by weighting equally all ﬁrms in
that decile ranking. The momentum strategy involves buying the winner and selling the loser portfolio
and holding the position for six months (from t+1 to t+6). The monthly returns represent the equally-
weighted average return from this month’s momentum strategy and all strategies from up to ﬁve months
ago. Each subsequent row in the table represents a monotonically decreasing sample of stocks obtained
by sequentially excluding ﬁrms with the lowest credit rating. The ﬁrst column shows the raw monthly
proﬁts from the momentum strategy for each subsample of ﬁrms. t-statistics are in parentheses. The
second column shows the market capitalization of the given subsample as a percentage of the overall
sample of S&P rated ﬁrms. The third (forth) column provides the average number (percentage) of ﬁrms
per month in each subsample. Sample: July 1985 - December 2003.
Stock Sample Momentum Percent of Total Number of Percentage
Proﬁts Market Cap Firms of Firms
All ﬁrms 1.29 100.00 1,639.00 100.00
(3.15)
AAA-D 1.28 100.00 1,638.79 99.99
(3.13)
AAA-C 1.23 99.98 1,637.69 99.92
(2.98)
AAA-CC 1.23 99.98 1,637.69 99.92
(2.98)
AAA-CCC− 1.21 99.97 1,636.91 99.87
(2.96)
AAA-CCC 1.18 99.97 1,635.83 99.81
(2.89)
AAA-CCC+ 1.13 99.95 1,632.70 99.62
(2.79)
AAA-B− 1.12 99.90 1,625.35 99.17
(2.81)
AAA-B 1.00 99.65 1,603.33 97.82
(2.62)
AAA-B+ 0.84 99.12 1,559.48 95.15
(2.33)
AAA-BB− 0.68 98.12 1,426.10 87.01
(2.02)
AAA-BB 0.56 96.62 1,292.14 78.84
(1.73)
AAA-BB+ 0.43 95.03 1,181.43 72.08
(1.38)
AAA-BBB− 0.39 92.96 1,085.80 66.25
(1.26)
AAA-BBB 0.31 89.06 943.73 57.58
(1.02)
AAA-BBB+ 0.26 82.96 762.56 46.53
(0.84)
AAA-A− 0.23 75.65 612.67 37.38
(0.75)
AAA-A 0.21 68.02 467.64 28.53
(0.69)
AAA-A+ 0.13 51.97 287.00 17.51
(0.42)
AAA-AA− 0.33 38.94 176.44 10.76
(1.12)
23Table VI
Independent Sorts by Credit Risk and Alternative Firm Characteristics
For each month t, all stocks rated by Standard & Poor’s with available return data for months t − 6
through t − 1 (formation period) are divided into 9 groups based on their size/volatility/leverage/cash
ﬂow volatility/age/analyst following/dispersion (bottom 30%, average 40%, and top 30%) and S&P
rating (best 30%, average 40%, and worst 30%). We exclude stocks which at the end of month t−1 are
priced below $5 or are smaller than the smallest NYSE size decile. The table shows, for each group,
the average returns of the momentum strategy, which involves buying the winner portfolio P10 of the
best-performing 10% of the stocks based on their returns over the formation period and selling the
loser portfolio P1 and holding the position for six months (t + 1 through t + 6). Cash Flow Volatility
(CVOL) is computed as in Zhang (2006) as the standard deviation of cash ﬂow from operations in the
past 5 years (with a minimum of 3 years). The Age variable represents the number of months since the
ﬁrm’s IPO. If the IPO date is not available in Compustat, then the Age variables represents the number
of months since CRSP ﬁrst reported return data for this ﬁrm. Analyst coverage is computed as the
average number of analysts following a ﬁrm. Analyst dispersion is measured as the standard deviation
in analyst EPS forecasts for the next quarter, extracted from I/B/E/S.
PANEL A: Independent Sort by Credit Risk and Size
Rating Tercile
Low Risk Average Risk High Risk
Small 0.31 0.75 2.66
(0.64) (1.70) (4.94)
Average 0.34 0.58 2.04
(1.05) (1.67) (3.23)
Big 0.28 0.94 1.79
(0.84) (2.10) (2.25)
PANEL B: Independent Sort by Credit Risk and Volatility
Rating Tercile
Low Risk Average Risk High Risk
Low Volatility 0.11 0.43 1.18
(0.53) (1.95) (3.36)
Average Volatility 0.40 0.79 1.69
(1.29) (2.49) (4.59)
High Volatility -0.07 1.30 2.68
(-0.14) (2.59) (4.17)
PANEL C: Independent Sort by Credit Risk and Leverage (BV(Debt)/MV(Equity))
Rating Tercile
Low Risk Average Risk High Risk
Low Leverage -0.08 0.96 2.76
(-0.21) (2.24) (2.87)
Average Leverage -0.20 0.14 1.29
(-0.56) (0.40) (2.57)
High Leverage 0.79 0.51 2.80
(1.50) (1.12) (4.10)
24Table VI (continued)
PANEL D: Independent Sort by Credit Risk and Age of Firm
Rating Tercile
Low Risk Average Risk High Risk
Young 0.45 1.02 2.75
(0.99) (2.31) (4.26)
Average 0.23 0.65 1.82
(0.80) (1.96) (3.63)
Old 0.17 0.51 1.50
(0.59) (1.59) (3.14)
PANEL E: Independent Sort by Credit Risk and Cash Flow Volatility
Rating Tercile
Low Risk Average Risk High Risk
Low CVOL 0.20 0.38 1.21
(0.69) (1.03) (1.96)
Average CVOL 0.51 0.77 2.51
(1.21) (1.79) (3.59)
High CVOL 0.27 0.68 2.49
(0.46) (1.10) (3.25)
PANEL F: Independent Sort by Credit Risk and Dispersion in Analyst Forecasts
Rating Tercile
Low Risk Average Risk High Risk
Low Dispersion 0.28 0.76 1.57
(0.90) (2.01) (2.84)
Average Dispersion 0.07 0.37 2.04
(0.24) (0.98) (3.77)
High Dispersion 0.28 0.59 2.11
(0.74) (1.40) (2.81)
25Notes
1See, e.g., Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrah-
manyam (1998), Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), Grin-
blatt and Han (2005), Avramov and Chordia (2005), among others.
2We use the S&P Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating. Data on this variable
is available on Compustat on a quarterly basis starting from the second quarter of 1985.
3The entire spectrum of ratings is as follows. AAA=1, AA+=2, AA=3, AA−=4,
A+=5, A=6, A−=7, BBB+=8, BBB=9, BBB−=10, BB+=11, BB=12, BB−=13,
B+=14, B=15, B−=16, CCC+=17, CCC=18, CCC−=19, CC=20, C=21, D=22.
4A number of stocks delist from our sample over the holding period. Loser stocks are
likely to delist due to low prices or bankruptcy while winner stocks may delist due to
an acquisition. This could potentially lead to biased results. To ensure that there are
no delisting biases, throughout the paper, we use the delisting return whenever a stock
disappears from our sample.
5We have veriﬁed that our results hold for independent sorts as well.
6Recessionary and expansionary months are identiﬁed by NBER.
7Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2006) also show that high information uncertainty stocks
have lower future returns.
8Monthly volatility for a stock is the sum of the square of the daily returns within
the month and leverage is deﬁned as the ratio of book value of debt to the market value
of equity.
9Firm age is measured as the number of months since the ﬁrm’s IPO.
10Cash ﬂow volatility is computed as in Zhang (2006).
2611We do not present results for analyst following because ﬁrm size and analyst follow-
ing are highly correlated.
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